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Abstract: The most challenging applications in heterogeneous cloud ecosystems are those that are able to maximise 
the benefits of the combination of the cloud resources in use: multi-cloud applications. They have to deal 
with the security of the individual components as well as with the overall application security including the 
communications and the data flow between the components. In this paper we present a novel approach 
currently in progress, the MUSA framework. The MUSA framework aims to support the security-intelligent 
lifecycle management of distributed applications over heterogeneous cloud resources. The framework 
includes security-by-design mechanisms to allow application self-protection at runtime, as well as methods 
and tools for the integrated security assurance in both the engineering and operation of multi-cloud 
applications. The MUSA framework leverages security-by-design, agile and DevOps approaches to enable 
the security-aware development and operation of multi-cloud applications. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Cloud computing is an emerging promising 
paradigm for enabling new business models and 
economies of scale based on on-demand 
provisioning of IT resources (both hardware and 
software) over a network as metered services, where 
consumers are billed only for what they consume. A 
recent IDC Cloud forecast shows that the investment 
on public cloud services is expected to be more than 
€77,287 million in 2017 (IDC Cloud research, 
2013). 
Nevertheless, enterprises consider security as the 
#1 inhibitor to cloud adoptions (Waidner, 2009) 
(Expert Group Report. European Commission, 
2010). Companies are reluctant to adopt cloud 
computing because of the difficulty in evaluating the 
trade-off between cloud benefits and the additional 
security risks and privacy issues it may bring. Most 
concerns are related to data protection, regulations 
compliance (Symantec, 2013) (Bitcurrent cloud 
computing survey, 2011) and other issues due to 
lack of insight (of controls and governance 
processes) in the outsourcing of data and 
applications: data confidentiality, trust on 
aggregators, control over data and/or code location, 
and resource assignment in multi-tenancy (Expert 
Group Report. European Commission, 2010). 
Businesses that want to exploit cloud computing 
need to be vigilant in understanding the potential 
privacy and security breaches in this new 
environment (Hubbard & Sutton, 2010).  
Secure cloud environments are even more 
challenging today, since they are becoming more 
and more complex in reference to the number of 
cloud resource types that are available “as a 
service”. Besides the traditional three service models 
defined by the NIST (Mell & Grance, 2010) (IaaS, 
PaaS and SaaS), new models are showing up such as 
Network as a Service specified by the ITU-T or Data 
as a Service defined in ISO/IEC 17826:2012 
(ISO/IEC 17826:2012, 2012).  
As the number of cloud models, cloud resources 
and cloud service providers grow in the market, it 
becomes theoretically easy (but not necessarily 
technically) for the cloud consumer to deploy and 
use multiple cloud solutions at the same time in an 
integrated way (Miller, 2013). This means that 
despite the diverse characteristics of the cloud 
resources such as own management APIs and own 
service level offerings (both functional and security), 
all need to be monitored and managed as an 
integrated working entity.  
The most challenging applications in 
heterogeneous cloud ecosystems are those that are 
able to maximise the benefits of the combination of 
the cloud resources in use: multi-cloud applications. 
For the context of this paper, a multi-cloud 
application is understood as a distributed 
application over heterogeneous cloud resources 
whose components are deployed in different cloud 
service providers and still they all work in an 
integrated way and transparently for the end-user.  
Multi-cloud application solutions have to deal 
with the security of the individual components as 
well as with the overall application security 
including the communications and the data flow 
between the components. Even if each of the cloud 
service providers offered its own security controls, 
the multi-cloud application has to ensure an 
integrated security across the whole composition. 
Therefore, the overall security depends on the 
security properties of the application components, 
which in turn depend on the security properties 
offered by the cloud resources they exploit. For 
instance, the database component in charge of 
storing sensitive data cannot ensure a high 
confidentiality if the cloud storage resource in which 
it is deployed does not use strong encryption 
algorithms. Consequently, the whole multi-cloud 
application may be not sufficiently safe.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
describes the intended advances over the state of the 
art. Section 3 explains the MUSA approach and 
introduces the MUSA framework. Section 4 explains 
the future validation of the framework in industrial 
case studies. Finally, section 5 discusses the future 
work. 
2 STATE OF THE ART 
As outlined in introduction, the main purpose of the 
MUSA framework is to offer a solution to build 
security-aware multi-cloud applications. This 
research activity involves many different open 
research aspects, among them we focus on the 
following questions: How do we identify the security 
requirements of a multi-cloud application? How can 
we ensure security of a multi-cloud application even 
when control over some of its components is not 
granted?? How do we deploy a multi-cloud 
application maintaining the promised security 
features? 
The following three subsections try to offer a 
brief summary of the state of the art of the existing 
replies to such questions. 
 
2.1 Security-by-design in Multi-Cloud 
Applications 
Security by design (SbD) was first positioned by 
Gartner (Kreizman & Robertson) and pointed out the 
importance of incorporating security into the 
enterprise architecture process since the beginning, 
i.e. by including security requirements in the design 
process. In addition, Gartner recently defined the 
Runtime Application Self-Protection (RASP) 
(Gartner) security concept which is a security 
technology capable of controlling the application 
execution and detecting and preventing real-time 
attacks. The concept behind this idea would be that 
the application itself is able to control and manage 
security mechanisms embedded in the application or 
which can be invoked as a service by the 
application. 
Security Control frameworks are widely adopted 
tools used to identify the security controls required 
to ensure the protection of an ICT system. A security 
control is a safeguard or a countermeasure 
prescribed to protect a system and meet a set of 
defined security requirement. Control Frameworks 
are a structured list of security controls that help a 
security expert to select the checks to perform in 
order to guarantee the respect of security 
requirements of a given system. Example of such 
Control Frameworks are the NIST Control 
Framework (NIST 800-53r4, 2013) and the ISO/IEC 
27001 (ISO/IEC 27001). 
In Cloud environments such frameworks are of 
limited use since they mostly miss specific cloud 
related security controls. Nevertheless, several 
attempts to address these issues have been made in 
(NIST SP500, 2010), (Cloud Data Protection Cert, 
2013), (Cloud Security Alliance, 2014). 
2.2 Security Aware SLAs in Multi-
Cloud Applications 
As stated above, in this paper, multi-cloud 
applications are distributed applications that run 
consuming cloud resources. Such an approach 
implies that the multi-cloud application developer 
and owner (i.e. the one that runs it and offers its 
services) have no control over the real execution 
environment of the application. This inhibits the 
correct evaluation of the security controls.  
The approach almost universally followed to 
define guarantees for users of a service is the 
introduction of Service Level Agreements (SLAs). 
An SLA is a formal agreement between a service 
provider and its end user that describes functional 
and non-functional aspects of the provided target 
service, together with clearly defined responsibilities 
of the involved parties.  
The most well-known machine-readable SLA 
models are the Open Grid Forum’s Web Services 
Agreement (WS-Agreement) (Hubbard & Sutton, 
2010) and IBM’s Web Service Level Agreement 
(WSLA) (VukoliĆ, 2010). The WS-Agreement 
specification proposes a domain-independent and 
standard way to create SLAs while its predecessor 
WSLA seems to be deprecated.  
SLAs appear as a successful method to guarantee 
common Quality of Service parameters, like 
availability and performance indicators. As stated in 
many recent works, such as (Kandukuri, Paturi, & 
Rakshit, 2009), in order to deal with security 
requirements in the Cloud ecosystem, SLAs should 
be actually used to define target service security 
parameters.  
Security Service Level Agreements (often named 
SecLA), are recognized as a promising way to model 
security issues between Cloud Service Providers and 
their users. ENISA, in (Dekker & Hogben, 2011), 
has also identified the importance of SecLAs in the 
Cloud computing field, pointing out that, in many 
circumstances, customers are not aware of many 
acquired services security aspects.  
As introduced in (Almorsy, Grundy, & Ibrahim, 
2011) and in (Luna et al, 2013), the current dearth of 
reasoning techniques on Security SLAs is preventing 
the diffusion of these approaches in production 
environments. Nevertheless, currently, many efforts 
are being made to fill this gap. For example, in 
(Luna et al, 2013), authors aim to outline techniques 
to quantitatively reason about Cloud Security SLAs, 
defining security metrics and a proof of concept 
semi -automated framework in order to assess cloud 
security of different providers.  
Several European projects have worked or are 
working in this subject focusing mainly on SecSLA 
negotiation (SPECS Project, 2014), the creation of a 
security-aware SLA based language and related 
cloud security dependency model (CUMULUS 
project) and on the accountability for cloud-based 
services (A4Cloud Project, 2014). 
 
2.3 Security Driven Dynamic 
Deployment of Multi-Cloud 
Applications 
Multi-cloud applications have complex composition, 
provisioning and deployment requirements, and the 
application design becomes even more complex at 
the time an additional aspect such as security enters 
in the equation. Therefore, several initiatives are 
running in order to support this type of activities. 
CloudML (CloudML project, 2013) (Ferry et al, 
2013) developed a domain-specific language to 
support the specification of provisioning, 
deployment and adaptation concerns related to 
multi-cloud systems at design-time and their 
enactment at runtime. CloudML’s background is 
PIM4Cloud language, defined in REMICS project 
(REMICS Consortium, 2012) (Ferry, Chauve, 
Rossini, Morin, & Solberg, 2013).  
Based on CloudML, different approaches 
(ARTIST Consortium, 2013) (ModaClouds 
consortium, 2013) (PaaSage Consortium, 2014) and 
versions of CloudML have been recently released to 
provide means to the design of cloud based 
applications deployment. In this context where there 
are multiple CloudML versions, a joint task force 
has been started by MODAClouds, PaaSage and 
ARTIST projects which goal is to define a unique 
common CloudML specification (ARTIST 
Consortium, 2013). 
Another approach that can be followed includes 
TOSCA (OASIS, 2013). The TOSCA specification 
aims to enhance the portability of cloud applications 
and services by using a language for defining both 
the service components of distributed applications 
and the service management interfaces (Antonescu, 
Robinson, & Braun, 2012). This approach is 
currently being followed by SeaClouds (Seaclouds 
consortium, 2013). 
3  MUSA APROACH: THE MUSA 
FRAMEWORK 
Multi-cloud solutions represent a new challenging 
field in order to add value to overall cloud client 
experience (VukoliĆ, 2010). In order to exploit 
multi-clouds potentialities, different architectural 
approaches can be adopted (Bohli et al, 2013): 
(i) replication of applications, i.e. the same system 
is deployed in more than one provider and 
malicious attacks can be easily discovered 
comparing operation results;  
(ii) partition of application system into tiers, that 
allows to separate logic from data;  
(iii) partition of application logic into fragments, 
that obfuscates the overall application logic to 
providers;  
(iv) partition of application data into fragments, 
that makes impossible to a single provider to 
reconstruct data, safeguarding confidentiality. 
 
MUSA aims at ensuring the security in all multi-
cloud environments including those that combine 
multiple scenarios as described above. To this aim, 
MUSA approach combines i) a preventive security 
approach, promoting Security by Design practices in 
the development and embedding security 
mechanisms in the application, and ii) a reactive 
security approach, monitoring application runtime to 
mitigate security incidents, so multi-cloud 
application providers can be informed and react to 
them without losing end-user trust in the multi-cloud 
application.  
In order to ensure the preventive oriented 
security to be embedded and aligned with reactive 
security measures, MUSA supports an integrated 
coordination of all phases in the application lifecycle 
management. 
3.1 The MUSA Framework 
The MUSA framework presented in this paper is 
intended to provide support the integration of the 
security within the multi-cloud application lifecycle, 
as illustrated in Figure 1. MUSA supports the first 
phase of the multi-cloud application lifecycle, the 
development phase, through the MUSA IDE, which 
helps in both specifying the end user security 
requirements and integrate such requirements in the 
application development. 
The MUSA Decision support tool and MUSA 
Distributed deployment tool support the multi-cloud 
application deployment phase, helping in the choice 
of the cloud service provider and deployment of the 
multi-cloud application deployment. 
The MUSA security assurance platform (SaaS) 
supports the last phase of the multi-cloud application 
lifecycle (execution phase), monitoring the 
application execution and, when needed, applying 
correction actions to grant the security features. 
The MUSA framework aims to define a set of 
best practices and guidelines for the integrated 
management of Security by Design mechanisms in 
the lifecycle of multi-cloud secure applications, 
based on DevOps and agile (AgileManifesto, 2001) 
methodologies’ principles. The practices are 
supported by the different automation tools provided 
in the MUSA framework, which enable the 
coordination between programming and deployment 
infrastructure worlds, ensuring the continuous 
alignment of multi-cloud application security 
requirements specification (both at composition and 




Figure 1: MUSA approach. 
Following section describes the proposed tools 
in more detail. 
3.1.1 Multi-cloud Secure Applications 
Design 
For an effective design of multi-cloud secure 
applications an integrated development environment 
(IDE) is needed. To solve this requirement, MUSA 
framework intends to deliver an IDE that allows the 
design of application components taking into 
account security requirements. This IDE will be 
based on existing open-source solutions and will 
include three main modules. 
The first module is a security requirements 
specification tool for multi-cloud applications, 
taking into consideration multi-cloud SLA definition 
and composition. The tool will allow expressing in 
the multi-cloud application SLA the security 
requirements (QoSec) together with functional and 
business requirements (QoS). To this aim, the 
needed components’ and cloud resources’ SLA 
composition shall be computed. 
The second module supports the design of the 
breakdown of multi-cloud application into 
components based on the combination of functional, 
business and security properties that the multi-cloud 
application should offer. The tool will be based on 
existing standards such as CloudML (CloudML 
project, 2013) and TOSCA (OASIS, 2013), and will 
help application developers to design the 
architecture and the components composition taking 
into account the SLAs of the cloud resources in 
which the components will be deployed;  
The last tool has the goal of design the 
provisioning and the deployment configuration of 
the needed heterogeneous cloud resources at 
multiple clouds layers (IaaS, PaaS).  
Moreover, the MUSA IDE will include a set of 
security libraries that, embedded in the multi-cloud 
application, will enable the activation of security 
mechanisms and security controls without modifying 
the programming model. The security libraries aim 
at proposing a non-intrusive approach to introduce 
security in multi-cloud applications. These libraries 
will be inserted into the multi-cloud application 
components at design time and will be the 
responsible for ensuring the overall security at 
runtime. This software will include detection of non-
compliant behaviour and enforcement mechanisms 
to be executed at runtime.  
3.1.2 Multi-cloud Secure Applications 
Deployment 
Once the application has been successfully designed, 
it has to be deployed. Deploying multi-cloud 
applications on distributed and heterogeneous 
resources encompasses several challenges that are 
not addressed currently in the existing tools. To 
solve this challenge, MUSA aims to provide a secure 
multi-cloud deployment tool that offers a distributed 
deployment service based on the dynamic selection 
of the cloud service providers (CSPs) that match 
with the application risk analysis, the subsequent 
security requirements as well as functional and 
business needs. In order to achieve it, the MUSA 
framework bases its offering mainly over three 
components. The first one is the cloud resource 
categorization of CSPs based on the measures of the 
security and functional properties at real time. The 
second component, a decision support tool, allows 
the selection of the cloud resources which 
combination is compliant with the security and 
functional requirements specified in the multi-cloud 
application composite SLA, after a previous 
simplified process of risk analysis. Finally, the third 
component allows an automated deployment of the 
multi-cloud secure application, distributing each of 
the application components’ packages towards the 
matched cloud resource. 
3.1.3 Multi-cloud Secure Applications 
Runtime 
Monitoring multi-cloud applications at runtime 
involves collecting metrics of QoS and QoSec 
parameters of both the components of the 
application and the cloud resources provisioned. 
MUSA aims to provide a monitoring service capable 
of collecting such measurements by using  standard 
APIs (if they are used by the cloud service providers 
(CSP)), cloud interoperability frameworks such as 
jclouds (Apache, 2012), or measures provided by 
MUSA security embedded libraries. 
Whenever an incident occurs, MUSA sends 
alerts to notify the application provider about 
detected security relevant incidents. Moreover, 
MUSA send alerts when an application is in risk of 
not fulfilling its SLA, and some preventive action 
needs to be taken in order to keep security 
parameters well counterweighted with performance 
or within the margins specified in the SLA, e.g. a 
redeployment of application components across a 
different combination of cloud resources. 
Finally, the enforcement service offered by 
MUSA ensures that the multi-cloud application 
respects the security requirements in its SLA.  
All three services (monitoring, notification and 
enforcement) are delivered in the form of a security 
assurance platform, packaged as a SaaS product. The 
MUSA SaaS security assurance platform 
collaborates closely with the embedded libraries to 
enforce the security protection of the multi-cloud 
application user’s data, through mechanisms such as 
authentication, authorisation, data encryption, data 
location assurance, etc. when the cloud resources 
used do not offer such mechanisms. 
The MUSA SaaS will store monitored security 
parameters over the cloud resources and 
components, and manage the necessary notifications 
and alerts, so as the multi-cloud application provider 
can early react to possible security breaches. 
Contract verification processes will require a 
mapping between low-level resource metrics and 
high-level security parameters of the cloud services. 
This process will be done at runtime by MUSA 
SaaS, which will provide real-time assessment 
supported by complex processing of composed 
measures of low-level metrics.  
4  MUSA FRAMEWORK 
VALIDATION 
The economic viability, user acceptance and 
practical usability of the MUSA framework is 
expected to be validated through piloting the 
solution in realistic industry environments 
representing highly relevant services for the 
European economy: airline flight scheduling systems 
and urban smart mobility services.  
In the following, we summarize the research 
challenges faced in both case studies. 
4.1 Case Study A: Airline Flight 
Scheduling Multi-Cloud 
Application 
For our first case study we have selected 
NetLine/Sched product by Lufthansa Systems to 
demonstrate how MUSA framework benefits the 
integrated security management of this application 
that exploits a number of heterogeneous cloud 
resources. 
The product NetLine/Sched supports all aspects 
of flight schedule development and management. 
In this case study, we are particularly interested 
in researching on how to:  
(i) allow NetLine/Sched developer declare the 
options regarding data localisation (e.g. 
location country of the files), data retention and 
deletion, data integrity, confidentiality, access 
control and availability, etc. and make possible 
that such policies are embedded in the 
application specification.  
(ii) enable security properties are embedded into 
the deployed application artefacts (security-by-
design) for their continuous control at 
operation. 
(iii) allow deployment into secure multi-cloud and 
multi-provider environments. 
(iv) provide automated security assurance, 
supported by continuous monitoring, 
enforcement and notification mechanisms. 
(v) keep the NetLine/Sched operator informed 
about the discrepancies and/or adapts to such 
requirements even in those cases that a change 
in the architecture or composition of the clouds 
underneath is needed. 
4.2 Case Study B: Smart Mobility 
Multi-Cloud Application 
Our second case study is an urban smart mobility 
multi-cloud application in Tampere city in Finland. 
Tampere Region has almost half a million 
inhabitants with a modal share of: 16% public 
transport, 27% pedestrians and cyclists, 57% private 
cars.  
Tampere City Council has a number of services 
exposed to allow companies and individual 
developers to develop, test and productize own 
traffic applications using public data. The services 
can be publicly accessed via Intelligent Transport 
Systems and Services (ITS) platform (Wikipedia 
ITS, 2014), which includes the public transport 
services APIs, other traffic related APIs, traffic data, 
etc. 
In this case study Tampere University (TUT) 
will take the role of many entrepreneur citizens and 
companies (generally SMEs) that create innovative 
applications by combining freely available open 
services and datasets in the Web to create business. 
The multi-cloud application by TUT aims at 
supporting the energy efficient and sustainable 
multi-modal transit of Tampere citizens when 
commuting from home to work and vice versa. 
The major challenges for MUSA in this case 
study are the following: 
(i) Enhance security capabilities of innovative 
services in transportation and public 
infrastructure in Tampere. 
(ii) Enable entrepreneurs and citizens willing to 
develop innovative services based on IST 
Factory to be able to easily integrate security-
intelligence into their applications through the 
use of MUSA IDE. 
(iii) Empower operators of the multi-cloud 
applications that integrate IST Factory cloud-
based services to ensure security of data 
storage and exchange at runtime through the 
use of MUSA assurance tools.  
(iv) Allow evaluating new service multi-cloud 
deployment implications by checking service 
dependencies on other network and cloud 
resources. 
5  FUTURE WORK 
Application growth, rise in complexity and need for 
interoperability create market opportunity for cloud 
integrators and multi-cloud providers by offering 
new capabilities in the existing complex cloud 
landscape (North Bridge in partnership with 
GigaOM Research, 2013). 
Taking profit of this opportunity window, 
MUSA aims at contributing to building up the 
innovation capacity and technology excellence of 
the European software and service industry by 
proposing a solution to master the security-
intelligent lifecycle of multi-cloud applications 
based on novel DevOps and security-by-design 
approaches. 
In this paper we have presented the MUSA 
framework whose main goal is to support the 
security-intelligent lifecycle management of multi-
cloud applications. There are a number of major 
challenges in the path: 
(i) Enable the security aware design of distributed 
applications over heterogeneous cloud 
resources.  
(ii) Automatic discovery and decision support 
system of combinations of cloud services that 
best match the required balance between 
security and functional properties. 
(iii) Security assurance though continuous 
monitoring and integrated methods in both 
engineering and operation of multi-cloud 
applications. 
The MUSA project which will lead to the 
development and validation of MUSA framework 
was launched on January 2015 and will last 36 
months. Future publications on the progress of the 
framework are expected both online (www.musa-
project.eu) and in future papers. 
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